While some threats to institutional quality still exist in specific countries, democracy has become the ‘only game in town’ in Latin America. But institutional weaknesses remain. This Policy Brief explores one of those weaknesses. It looks at the relationship between the executive and the legislature, and examines the question of horizontal accountability. Horizontal accountability expresses the concern for checks and oversight, for surveillance and institutional constraints on the exercise of power between the branches of government. It involves several ways of preventing and correcting the abuse of power. It opens up power for public inspection, forcing it to explain and justify its actions. A key component of horizontal accountability mechanisms is the existence of sanctions. In other words, accountability exists when the actions taken by executive bodies are held subject to oversight from the legislative authorities. But, is there a gap between what the law demands in terms of accountability and what actually happens? When horizontal accountability performance is low, good governance, transparency and the quality of democracy itself are put in jeopardy.

By studying a set of accountability mechanisms the brief demonstrates that horizontal accountability is working imperfectly in Argentina. Key gaps relate to loopholes in regulations and to low incentives for both the executive and legislature to comply with existing regulations. Recommendations are presented focused on strengthening horizontal accountability mechanisms through an improvement to regulations, policies and institutions. The existence of specific regulations that assign responsibilities, set deadlines and sanctions is of vital importance. The findings and recommendations from the Argentine case have important lessons for capacity building in other democracies as well.